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Brazil, Politics, the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup 
John Horne & Gabriel Silvestre 
Forthcoming in Kelly, John; Lee, Jung Woo; and Bairner, Alan (eds.) (2016) Routledge Handbook of 
Sport and Politics. London: Routledge. 
Introduction 
Brazil has been, in less than a century and half, a monarchy, a republic, and a federation. 
It has been ruled by parliament, civilian presidents, military juntas, general-presidents, 
and by a civilian dictator (Rocha and McDonagh, 2014, p. 61). 
Interest in the development of the political system of the largest nation in South America has 
been a long-standing feature of scholarly research (see for example Levine & Crocitti, 1999; 
McCann, 2008). Academic interest in sport in South America has been given a significant boost 
by the scheduled hosting of the two largest sports mega-events ± WKH),)$HQ¶VIRRWEDOORUOG
cup finals and the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games ± in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro in 
2014 and 2016 respectively. This is not to say that research has not been conducted until 
recently, but to acknowledge that the English-language literature has started to increase, and 
looks certain to grow even more rapidly in the coming years (for earlier research see Arbena, 
1999)2QHRIWKHUHDVRQVLVWKDWWKHVWDJLQJRIWKHVHµHJDV¶IRFXVHVWKHDWWHQWLRQRIWKHJOREDO
media and academics on the host nation and cities involved. 
Popular involvement in sport is one of the major accomplishments of the 100 years or so since 
modern sport was established.  But sport is not naturally followed anymore than people 
naturally go shopping. Sport consumers and audiences are made not born. This is also an 
accomplishment of political agencies, such as central (federal), regional and municipal 
government. In Soccer Madness Lever (1995/1983, p. 6) contends that sport generally and, in 
Brazil, football specifically, has the 'paradoxical ability to reinforce societal cleavages while 
transcending them'. She argues that sport/football can 'create social order while preserving 
cultural identity', thus promoting rather than impeding goals of national development (Lever 
1995, p. 22).  
Anthropologists, historians, human geographers, political scientists and sociologists, amongst 
other scholars, have begun to investigate a number of recurring topics that enable us to begin 
to understand these and other developments in South America. Football, by far and away the 
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most popular sport throughout South America, features in articles about fans, elite migrant 
labour, professional organizations and globalization (Gordon and Helal, 2001; Raspaud and 
Bastos, 2013; Ribeiro and Dimeo, 2009). Alvito (2007) notes for example that football in Brazil 
has faced the twin challenges of commercialization and mediatization for at least the past 30 
years. Mega-events attract accounts about the history of South American involvement, 
involvement in the Football World Cup and the Olympics and also the impacts of hosting on 
marginalised communities (Curi, 2008; Gaffney, 2010; Silvestre and Oliveira, 2012; Sánchez 
and Broudehoux, 2014). In addition to football, sports and other forms of physical culture 
discussed include surfing in Brazil and capoeira ± the Brazilian martial art that combines 
elements of dance, acrobatics and music (Knijnik et al, 2010; Almeida et al, 2013). Specific 
accounts of the development of policies for sport in Brazil, and discussion of the development 
of leisure in Brazil and gender divisions and sport also appear in the literature (Almeida et al, 
2012; Dias and Melo, 2011; Petca et al, 2013).  
Several articles contain overviews that summarise the history and development of sport and 
leisure in South America more generally, as well as those that discuss the complex composition 
of South American societies in the wake of centuries of immigration and colonial exploitation 
(Arbena, 1986, 2001; Guedes, 2011; Mangan, 2001). Hence the diaspora of Europeans ± the 
British, the Dutch, the French, the Germans and the Italians ± as well as Portuguese and Spanish 
are rivalled by that of Japanese people, creating in Brazil the largest Japanese-speaking 
population outside of the Far East (Cuéllar, 2013). In future, as research grows, at least in the 
English-language literature, it will undoubtedly fill some of the gaps in our understanding and 
thus overcome the exoticisation of South American culture often presented in popular travel 
programmes and documentaries. South America contains both economic giants, such as Brazil, 
and relatively smaller developing economies.  
In the past 30 years most of the developed and developing world have joined in the competitive 
marketing of places as social and economic opportunities seeking capital investment. Many 
µ&DULRFDV¶5LRGH-DQHLURORFDOV glued themselves to their TV screens at 11am local time on 
October 2nd, 2009, awaiting the results of a decision about whether or not Rio de Janeiro would 
host the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. On Copacabana beach, proposed site of the 
2016 beach volleyball competition, a huge party was scheduled whether or not Rio was 
selected. The decision to award the Olympics to Rio was very much the icing on a decade of steady 
development. %UD]LO¶VKDGEHHQRQHRIWKHIHHFRQRLHVWKDWKDGUHDLQHGVWDEOHDQGJURLQJ
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leading to it being hailed as one of the BRICS, the so called major emerging economies of 
Brazil, Russia, India, China (and additionally, South Africa).  
 
The BRICS account for RYHU  ELOOLRQ  SHUFHQW RI WKH RUOG¶V SRSXODWLRQ EXW RQO\
FRDQG  SHUFHQW RI JOREDO *'3 DQG KHQFH WKH\ DUH DOVR UHIHUUHG WR DV µHHUJLQJ
econoLHV¶*LYHQWKHKRVWLQJRIWKH Olympic Games by Beijing (2008), the Commonwealth 
Games by Delhi (2010), the FIFA World Cup by South Africa (2010), the Winter Olympic 
Games by Sochi (2014) and the FIFA World Cup by Russia (2018), as well as the Brazilian 
involvement in staging the Pan-American Games (2007), the FIFA World Cup (2014) and the 
Olympics (201 VRHKDYHVXJJHVWHG WKDWD µ%5,&6-VW\OH¶RIKRVWLQJVSRUWVHJD-events 
may be emerging (Curi et al, 2011). Curi et al point out that between 1950 and 2007 no major 
international sports event was hosted in Rio de Janeiro, the city lost its status as capital to 
Brasilia in 1960 and when it did stage the 2007 Pan-American Games they were the most 
expensive of that series of competitions ever held. The 2007 Pan-AMs were marked by very 
tight security including the erection of walls to separate games attendees from the local, poorer, 
population. Hence bidding to host these events has to be seen in a context where consumption-
based development is seen as a solution to urban problems as much as national ones (Gaffney 
2010).  
Whilst there were no groups organized in Rio specifically against the Olympic bid, there were 
several groups on the ground concerned with the legacy these Olympics would bring to Rio, 
and especially to the marginalised communities living in favelas (sometimes referred to as 
µVOXV¶ :KLOH HYLFWLRQ LQ OR-income, informal areas has become a not-uncommon 
consequence of mega-event planning worldwide, housing rights violations have reached 
significant proportions during recent Olympics. It is in this way that sport, and sports mega-
events such as the Olympics especially, may appear superficially as credible tools of 
development. Yet they do so in ways that does not challenge inequalities or neo-liberal 
development. In fact the hosting of sports mega-events may be a most convenient shell for the 
promotion of neo-liberal agendas, since they do not deviate from top down notions of economic 
and social development.  
This chapter comprises two parts: a very brief history of socio-cultural and political aspects 
of sport (especially football) in Brazil that provides the background and context for the 
second that discusses contemporary aspects of mega-event bidding and hosting in Brazil. The 
first part focuses on the role of football in forging national identity and the growth in 
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SRSXODULW\RIWKHVSRUW7KHSROLWLFVVXUURXQGLQJ%UD]LO¶VLQYROYHHQWLQWKH),)$:RUOG&XS
since 1950 is discussed. The domestic politics of Brazilian football and key figures João 
Havelange and his former son-in-law Ricardo Teixeira are also considered. The second part 
will consider bidding and national politics underpinning the FIFA World Cup 2014 and the 
Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympics, public protest and security, and demonstrations before and 
during the 2014 World Cup. The chapter concludes by considering the impact of mega-event 
hosting on political agendas and the outlook for football and other professional sports post-
mega-events in Brazil. 
Part I Sport and Politics in Brazil 
´7KHUHLVQRGLFWDWRUVKLSLQ%UD]LO%UD]LOLVDOLEHUDOFRXQWU\Dland of happiness. We 
are a free people. Our leaders know what is best for (us) and govern (us) in a spirit of 
WROHUDWLRQDQGSDWULRWLV´(Edson Arantes Nascimento da Silva (Pelé) speaking in 1972, 
quoted in Levine, 1980, p. 244). 
³I was kind of vague abouWWKHVHWKLQJV,GLGQ¶WWDONDERXWSROLWLFV´Pelé interviewed in 
1993 about the 1970s, in Levine and Crocitti eds. 1999, p. 256). 
A number of more journalistic accounts of football in Brazil are available that discuss the 
connection with nationalism and politics (see for example Humphrey, 1986; Goldblatt, 2014; 
Zirin, 2014). Here we briefly refer to two of the key academic sources that these journalistic 
accounts rely on (Lever, 1995/1983; and Levine, 1980) to provide a brief historical 
contextualisation of the relations between politics and sport in Brazil.  
Levine (1980, p. 233) recognises the possibility of viewing sport, and especially football, as a 
form of opiate and distraction and thus an agency of social control. He also acknowledges the 
alternative view that sport provides a source of group identity and social integration, and thus 
can act as a unifier of local, regional and national populations. He argues however that in the 
FDVH RI %UD]LO µIXWHERO¶V FKLHI VLJQLILFDQFH KDV EHHQ LWV XVH E\ WKH HOLWH WR EROVWHU RIILFLDO
LGHRORJ\DQGWRFKDQQHOVRFLDOHQHUJ\LQD\VFRSDWLEOHLWKSUHYDLOLQJVRFLDOYDOXHV¶Thus 
KHDSSHDUVWRDGRSWDSHUVSHFWLYHRUHLQNHHSLQJLWKWKDWRI$QWRQLR*UDVFLRUµKHJHRny 
WKHRU\¶ 
Lever (1995, p. 56), adopting the integration perspective, DUJXHVWKDWµVSRUWSURRWHGQDWLRQDO
integration in Brazil long before other social organizations criss-crossed the nDWLRQ¶. By 1914 
Brazil had a national federation of sports clubs, the Confederação Brasileira de Desportos 
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&%'RUµBrazilian Sports Confederation¶, and the football club as an institution dates from 
the late 19th century. Levine (1980, p. 234) suggests that the development of football in Brazil 
falls into four broad periods: 1894-1904, the development of private urban clubs for foreigners 
(especially the British, German and Portuguese); 1905-1933, the amateur phase which 
nonetheless saw a marked growth in interest; 1933-1950, professionalisation and participation 
on the world stage, including the hosting of the fourth FIFA World Cup Finals in 1950; and 
since 1950, world-class recognition and the growth of commercialism. This remains a useful 
way of understanding the emergence of the sport in Brazil (for greater detail see Bellos, 2002; 
Gaffney, 2008; Goldblatt, 2014).  
The first football clubs to be established in Rio reflected the influence of foreigners ± Vasco 
da Gama established in 1898 at the Lusitania club for Portuguese merchants and bankers, 
)OXLQHQVH GHYHORSHG RXW RI WKH %ULWLVK µ5LR &ULFNHW DQG $WKOHWLF $VVRFLDWLRQ¶ LQ 02, 
Botafogo were a spin-off from a rowing club (1904) and Flamengo, formerly another rowing 
club, was formed in 1915 when athletes defected from Fluminense. Thus are great sporting 
rivalries created within the boundaries of one city. Indicative of the growth of national pride 
associated with football, Levine (1980, p. 233) notes that: 
Following four matches in July 1929 by the touring Chelsea Football Club against 
Brazilian teams, Mr Steele, of the British Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, officially 
recommended that such future visits be discouraged, since the local partisans had 
behavHGRXWUDJHRXVO\LQWLLGDWHGWKHUHIHUHHVDQGWLFHYLFWRULRXV³FODLDVDQDWLRQ
WRKDYHEHDWHQ(QJODQG´¶ 
Popular interest in the sport was aided, as in other nations, by the growth of media reporting of 
the results by the newspaper press from the 1900s and radio from the 1930s. 
Levine (1999, p. 44) notes how Government expanded into everyday life, including sport, in 
Brazil in the 1930s. The Government seized upon the Brazilian victory in the 1932 South 
American Cup and a year later football became a national institution when it was 
professionalised under the auspices of the CBD. In 1941 the club network in Brazil was linked 
WRWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQHQWE\3UHVLGHQW9DUJDV¶VFHQWUDOL]DWLRQSURJUDH$1DWLRQDO6SRUW
Council (CND) within the Ministry of EGXFDWLRQ DQG &XOWXUH DV HVWDEOLVKHG WR µRULHQW
finance, DQGHQFRXUDJHWKHSUDFWLFHRIVSRUWLQDOORI%UD]LO¶/HYHUSLever (1995, 
p. 59) argues that from the beginning of the diffusion and adoption of modern sport, µVSRUWDQG
JRYHUQHQW RUH WKDQ FRH[LVW WKHLU UHODWLRQVKLS LV EHWWHU GHVFULEHG DV V\ELRWLF¶ Whilst 
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individual athletes, such as tennis player Maria Bueno, who won four times at Forest Hills and 
three times at Wimbledon between 1959 and 1966, and racing driver Emerson Fittipaldi who 
was at his best in Formula One racing in the 1970s, may have been used to symbolise Brazilian 
greatness, /HYHUSDUJXHVWKDWLWµLVWKURXJKWHDVSRUWVLWKWKHLUKLJKO\RUJDQLVHG
structure that precedes and outlives any particular set of athletes, that more than momentary 
unification of a nation is estaEOLVKHG¶She argues that LQ%UD]LOµSROLWLFLDQVKDYHVSXUUHGWKH
growth of both spectator and participant sport; sport, in return, has helped politicians court 
poSXODULW\ DQGKDV KHOSHG WKH %UD]LOLDQJRYHUQHQW DFKLHYH LWV QDWLRQDOLVWLF JRDOV¶ /HYHU
1995, p. 59). In many ways therefore her argument can be seen as complementary to that of 
Levine. 
/HYHUSDUJXHVWKDWWKHRGHUQKLVWRU\RI%UD]LOLVµRQH of social and economic 
FKDQJHWKURXJKDXWKRULWDULDQFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ¶6SRUWKDVSOD\HGLWVSDUWLQWKLVLQYDULRXVD\V
7KH LOLWDU\ FRXS G¶pWDW LQ  VD WKH HVWDEOLVKHQW RI army presidents. In 1968, as 
repression intensified, the President, General Emílio Garrastazu Médici, began taking an 
interest in Flamengo and the national team. When Brazil won the FIFA World Cup for an 
unprecedented third time in Mexico in 1970 the team was flown directly from Mexico City to 
the capital Brasilia, and the players were personally received by Médici in the Planalto Palace 
(Levine, 1980, p. 246). Two days of national celebration followed and shortly after the military 
took over the CBD (eventually renamed the Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) after a 
demand by FIFA in 1979).  
Although there was considerable interest in football it is clear that less attention was paid to 
GHYHORSLQJRWKHUµ2O\SLFVSRUWV¶/HYLQHS When it was suggested to President-
designate General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, that amateur sport should be given 
greater emphasis to improve Brazilian performance at the Olympic Games, he retorted that the 
2O\SLFVHUHµ´SROLWLFDOSURSDJDQGDIRUQDWLRQVKRQHHGHGWKDWVRUWRIWKLQJ´¶XRWHGLQ
Levine, 1980, p. 250). %UD]LO¶VDFKLHYHHQWVDWWKH6XHU2O\SLFVFRQWLQXHWREHmiddle 
ranking, including never having secured a gold medal in either WKHHQ¶VRURHQ¶Vfootball 
competition. The top medal producing sports have been volleyball, sailing and judo. 
Lever (1995, pp. 61-62; see also Goldblatt, 2014 pp. 122-157) provides several examples of 
the way in which football and politics mixed in Brazil during the dictatorship. When she was 
conducting interviews with workers in the early 1970s, a low increase in the monthly minimum 
wage was augmented with the giving away of 15,000 free tickets for the match between 
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Flamengo and Fluminense (the team of the masses versus the team of the elite). At the time, 
WKHVWDWHDOVRUHJXODWHGD[LXWLFNHWSULFHVIRUHQWUDQFHWRWKHµSRSXODU¶VHFWLRQVRISXEOLF
VWDGLD VXFK DV WKH µJHUDO¶ LQ WKH Maracanã in Rio. Football club directorships were also 
stepping-stones to political careers, and politicians have used the sport to further their interests 
(Kuper, 1994). Admiral Helenio Nunes, President of the CBD and ARENA (the official 
government political party) in the state of Rio de Janeiro used matches prior to the 1978 World 
&XSLQ$UJHQWLQDDVSROLWLFDOUDOOLHVIHDWXULQJ$5(1$¶VEDQQHUVDQGLOLWDU\EDQGVPolitical 
figures claimed to be fans even when they were not. In June 1973 when the government 
announced President Médici¶V VXFFHVVRU D QRW HOO-known (military) man, the newspaper 
Jornal do Brasil featured his photograph on the front page with the caption: 
³Gaucho [meaning from the state of Rio Grande do Sul] from Bento Gonçalves [his 
hometown] 64 years old, fan of International in Porto Alegre and Botafogo in Rio, brother 
of two generals, married, with one daughter, Ernesto Geisel will be the 23rd president of 
WKHUHSXEOLF´FLWHGLQ/HYHUS 
Part II Sport, politics and the hosting of mega-events in Contemporary Brazil  
Since the re-democratization process in the late 1980s sports other than football have slowly 
attained greater prominence in the national political agenda resulting in the creation of a 
dedicated ministry under the government of President /XLV ,QDFLR µLula¶ da Silva of the 
Workers¶ Party. Attention and resources have been mostly oriented towards professional sports 
and were lately dominated by the hosting of mega-events (Almeida et al, 2012). The bidding 
campaigns for the FIFA 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games were fully endorsed 
by the national government and in the passionate support of President Lula who on the occasion 
of the awards declared that football was ³more than a sport for Brazilians, it is a national 
SDVVLRQ´DQGWKDWLWKWKH2O\SLFV³%UD]LOgained its international citizenship «>t] he world 
has finally recognised LWLV%UD]LO¶VWLH.´ (BBC Sport, 2007; Rohter, 2010:223). Such claims 
demonstrate the political capital to be explored in relation to two audiences: the Brazilian 
electorate and the international opinion.  
In the next two sections we pay attention to the political aspects of the preparation for the two 
events, here broadly defined to include the agendas of the federal and local governments, the 
interests of sports organisers and civil protests that have marked the build-up and staging of 
the football World Cup. We retrace the bidding and preparation history of the events whilst 
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reflecting on their expected contributions and impacts, a debate that rose to international 
prominence with the scenes of nation-wide protests. 
The FIFA 2014 World Cup 
Following the controversies surrounding the voting for the 2006 World Cup ± when the South 
African bid was beaten by one vote after the sudden change of mind of one delegate ± FIFA 
introduced a continental rotating system to designate host countries, starting with Africa and 
followed by South America. Since last hosting the event in 1950 Brazilian interest in organising 
a World Cup was unconvincingly presented in 1988 when its candidature received only two 
votes to host the 1994 World Cup (US Soccer, 2013). The new rotating system was thus an 
opportune occasion to which the then chairman of CBF, Ricardo Teixeira, worked in getting 
the support of the recently elected President Lula da Silva. 
Presidential support for the bid was initiated in 2004 when both Teixeira and Lula attended a 
friendly match between Brazil and Haiti in Port-au-Prince as part of a United Nations 
peacekeeping mission led by Brazilian troops. Despite expressing their interest both Argentina 
and Colombia would withdraw their candidatures leaving Brazil as the sole contender. In 
October 2007 Brazil was confirmed the host of the 2014 World Cup in an unusual situation 
since the host cities were still to be decided. From a shortlist of eighteen cities twelve were 
finally chosen in May 2009 after FIFA conceded the request to include more host-cities than 
the usual eight or ten. It included traditional venues in cities like Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and 
Belo Horizonte, as well as less obvious football destinations such as the cities of Manaus, 
Cuiabá and Brasília.  
A higher personal benefit seemed to hold for Teixeira, who accumulated the position of 
chairman of the local organising committee, whose intentions in running for the presidency of 
FIFA were speculated only for him to fall into disgrace. Chairman of CBF since 1989 and a 
former son-in-law of João Havelange, FIFA president from 1974 to 1998, Teixeira became a 
powerful figure in football politics by exploiting his position and networks at CBF and as an 
executive member of FIFA. Despite enduring congressional probing commissions into 
corruption in Brazilian football, personal wrongdoings and allegations of embezzlement by the 
international press, KHIRXQGKLVHOIDWRGGVLWK/XOD¶VVXFFHVVRU, President Dilma Rousseff, 
indisposed with his association to her government. Polemic declarations in the press stating 
that in 2014 he could do the µmost slippery, unthinkable, Machiavellian things¶ VXFK DV
µGenying press credentials, barring access, changing game schedules¶yet still nothing would 
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happen to him (Pinheiro, 2011), sparked media and public outrage on the eve of the World Cup 
qualifying draw with public demonstrations callLQJIRUµRXWLWK7HL[HLUD¶$OOHJLQJSHUVRQDO
health reasons he finally stepped down in 2012.  
The preparations for the World Cup were poised to be one of the main symbols RI5RXVVHII¶V
government following the announcement of an overalOSURJUDHSDFNDJHLQ/XOD¶VODVW\HDU
in office. A suite of agreements with state and municipal authorities were signed detailing 
works in stadiums, public transport, airports, tourism infrastructure and roads and highways. 
In order to facilitate and speed up the tendering of contracts, special regulations were enacted 
to flexibilise both the tendering process and the cap of municipal and state levels of 
indebtedness. State and local governments were responsible for tendering and contracting out 
the projects under their responsibility leading to varied outcomes as some projects were 
substantially reviewed, suspended by irregularities and even abandoned given the 
improbability of their conclusion on time, as many related to urban mobility such as 
underground transportation lines and light railways. 
The progress of works was at times obfuscated by the turbulence in the relationship between 
FIFA and the Brazilian government leading to the approval of a general set of laws in relation 
to the organisation of the event. These included the application of guarantees previously signed 
by the Brazilian government in relation to tax exemptions, the approval of visas and restrictions 
on ambush marketing, and also to other items that triggered heated debates such as 
concessionary tickets, the licensing for the sale of alcohol at the venues and the activities of 
street vendors in the surroundings of the venues. Minor concessions were made, such as half-
priced tickets for students and the elderly and the acquiescing for the permanence of the 
traditional baianas selling Afro-Brazilian food in Salvador. Still, the relationship with FIFA 
became more strained as delays became all too apparent.  
The immediate run-up to the event was plagued by delays, cost overruns, fatalities and nation-
wide protests. The national government stayed firm with the discourse of expected benefits 
accruing from the event with constant reference to the legacies that would benefit the majority 
of the population. There was mounting criticism from the press with the escalating budget 
figures, particularly with the costs of stadiums and their post-event use. In one of the extreme 
cases, the predicted ILQDOILJXUHIRU%UDVLOLD¶V1DWLRQDO6WDGLXDVDOmost double the original 
estimate while the future of the stadium post-World Cup remained uncertain given the absence 
of a competitive team in the upper tiers of the Brazilian football competitions. A similar 
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situation beckoned for the stadiums in Natal, Cuiabá and Manaus. Up to the completion of the 
stadiums 10 deaths of construction workers were registered as progress was rushed to meet 
deadlines. Half of the venues were unveiled for the Confederations Cup in 2013, the FIFA 
rehearsal tournament for the World Cup, despite ongoing works visible in the venues. Up to 
that point the expected budget for World Cup-related expenditure had already increased five-
times on the original estimates. One year to go and facing mounting challenges in several 
planning areas, the organization of the event found itself caught in the middle of a massive 
public protest that swept across the country. 
In June 2013 scenes of public demonstrations in the streets of Brazilian cities and heavy-handed 
police response were widely covered by the international press. What had started as a local 
protest in São Paulo against the rise in bus fares which brought some of its main thoroughfares 
to a halt, quickly triggered demonstrations elsewhere in the country after it was met by 
disproportionate repression by the police. Thousands poured into the streets of more than 350 
cities to express not only their indignation to scenes of police brutality widely circulated in 
social networks of the internet but also to release their discontentment with corrupted politics 
and the neglected state of public services.  
The composition of the masses, as political scientist Andre Singer (2014) observed, was made 
up of two large strata, that of the middle classes and what he identified DVWKHµQHSUROHWDULDW¶
a young working class with formal jobs but nonetheless poorly paid and with poor working 
conditions (p.24-5). Their banners also reflected different foci: while the former expressed their 
anger with the continuous corruption scandals that marred national politics and the Workers¶ 
Party, the latter manifested their revolt against issues closer to their daily lives; the poor 
condition of the public health, education and transport systems.  
The arrival of the Workers¶ Party in the federal government in 2002 coincided with a period of 
strong economic growth, improvement of social indicators and rising levels of consumption by 
the lower sections of the social scale that helped them to endure the global financial crisis 
relatively unscathed (Anderson, 2011). Its continuance in power was sealed via a familiar 
politic strategy in Brazil of securing support via shady deals. Exposed during the denouncement 
of a vote-buying scheme in 2005 that led to the sentencing of some of tKHSDUW\¶VWRSUDQNV
this long evolving story was also represented on some of the banners during the June 2013 
protests. Hence although able to afford more consumer goods, the urban poor have endured an 
ambiguous existence of formal jobs in precarious conditions and with poor public services. The 
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two agendas thus converged around a related and immediate event: the FIFA Confederations 
Cup in 2013.   
3URWHVWLQJDJDLQVWWKHYLOLILHGµ),)$VWDQGDUGV¶ often evoked in official discourses justifying 
the spending on football venues, Brazilians demanded the same level of quality in the delivery 
of public services. The ever-rising budget for the event, the finding of irregularities and the 
suspension of projects served to confirm the general sentiment that only the powerful and rich 
would benefit. Long-standing campaigning groups such as the Comitês Populares da Copa 
(µPopular Committees of the World Cup¶) highlighted the displacement of thousands of people 
from low-income communities by works related with the event, with estimates ranging between 
170,000 to 250,000 (Montenegro, 2013), and the appropriation of public improvements by 
private companies as the operation of the venues were privatised (Gaffney, 2014). Protest 
videos posted online went viral. The otherwise football-crazy image that characterised the 
portraying of Brazilian fans was nowhere to be seen in the Confederations Cup tournament as 
chants of `Não vai ter Copa!¶µ7here won't be a World Cup¶) and `Da Copa eu abro mão, 
quero meu dinheiro pra saúde e educação¶µ,JLYHXSWKH:RUOG&XS,DQW\RQH\to go 
LQWRKHDOWKDQGHGXFDWLRQ¶ echoed in many of the host cities. 
While some municipalities backtracked on their decision to raise transport fares the federal 
government responded with a public announcement from President Rousseff acknowledging 
the demands and condemning acts of vandalism. National programmes and new governmental 
intentions in healthcare, education and transport were announced. If the measure managed to 
placate widespread demonstrations, other protests smaller in numbers continued to be carried 
over in the following months. This was accompanied by a wave of strikes in the professions - 
especially the police, teachers, road sweepers and public transport operators - for improved pay 
and work conditions. FIFA continued to refute criticism of its role E\VWDWLQJWKDWLWDV%UD]LO¶V
decision to bid for the event and to propose the projects associated with the stadiums. 
The total cost of expenditure announced by the Brazilian government on the eve of the World 
Cup in 2014 was $11.3 billion (Boadle, 2014; the predicted total at the time of writing in 
February 2015 is now closer to $15 billion). It was a far-cry from initial government statements 
such as that of the LQLVWHURIVSRUWVEDFNLQWKDWLWRXOGEHWKHµ:RUOG&XSRIWKHSULYDWH
VHFWRU¶HDQLQJWKDWHVVHQWLDORUNVVXFKDVWKRVHGHVWLQHGIRUWKHYHQXHVRXOd be covered 
by private companies. The final financial breakdown saw almost 83% of the costs attributed to 
governmental spending or financed by state banks (Folha de São Paulo, 2014). It was perhaps 
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no wonder that, with the exception of one or two rather tame decorations celebrating the arrival 
of yet another World Cup, the vivid signs of popular excitement on the walls and streets of 
Brazilian cities that might have been expected with the hosting of a World Cup on home soil 
did not initially materialise in 2014. 
 
The Rio 2016 Olympic Games 
The 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic project bears some resemblances with the 2014 World Cup, 
in which big politics and long-time serving sports leaders played a pivotal role in securing the 
rights to host the event for the first time in a South American country. However, differently 
from the World Cup, in which football politics determined the urban agenda of hosting cities, 
it was the urban politics of Rio de Janeiro city that determined the Olympic project.  
Rio de Janeiro had previously unsuccessfully attempted to bring the 1930 and 1960 Olympic 
Games and the separate equestrian competition of the 1956 Olympics. A new bid would be 
prepared for the 2004 Olympic Games, this time as the outcome of an inter-urban policy 
exchange. The local elections of 1992 brought the conservative candidate Cesar Maia to 
government promising to bring urban order and modernise public administration. An important 
HOHHQWRI0DLD¶VDJHQGDDVWRHODERUDWHDVWUDWHJLFSODQWKHQLQYRJXHLQ1RUWK$HULFDQ
and European cities to set a vision for the city in collaboration with other representative groups. 
The initiative was pursued with the consulting services of policy-makers from Barcelona 
freshly after the organisation of the 1992 Olympic Games. It was out of this relationship that 
the concept of an Olympic bid was born, as a way to promote urban development and city 
marketing. 
Hastily prepared, the bid attempted to incorporate the general precepts of the 1992 Barcelona 
Olympic Games by earmarking declining urban areas for regeneration and a multi-cluster 
organisation. The event was also expected to turn around the image of a city synonymous with 
rampant crime and police-led carnage. The bid generated great support from the public while 
new promises were announced, including a bold social development agenda aimed to improve 
living conditions by eradicating poverty and upgrading slums. However, the bid failed to 
impress the IOC inspection and was not shortlisted in the final voting round. The dismal result 
frustrated some of the key promoters of the bid leaving re-elected Mayor Maia and the president 
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of the Brazilian Olympic Committee, Carlos Nuzman, to pick up the pieces and to drastically 
rearrange the Olympic project. 
Working his way through the Olympic system and becoming a member of the IOC, Nuzman 
translated the message that Brazil had to first prove its credentials by convincing Maia to 
support a bid to host the 2007 Pan American Games, the regional Olympic-styled competition 
IRUWKH$HULFDV*LYLQJDQRWKHULVHRGHVWFRSHWLWLRQDQµ2O\SLFWUHDWHQW¶WKHHYHQW
had original estimates multiplied by four as a set of venues were specially built for the event 
including an Olympic stadium, a velodrome, an indoor arena and an aquatics centre. This time 
the spatial planning privileged the expanding and wealthy district of Barra da Tijuca with the 
DWKOHWH¶VYLOODJHDGGLQJWRWKHORFDOJDWHG-community stock. Criticism, particularly in relation 
to the inflated costs, was somehow held-off as the experience was justified as an Olympic 
rehearsal with a new bid quickly announced for the 2016 Games. 
Up to this point the national government had played a supporting and guarantor role. President 
Lula had confirmed in 2003 the commitment of his government with the preparations for the 
2007 Pan American Games and his backing to a short-lived bid for the 2012 Olympics. The 
contribution of the federal government to the total budget for the 2007 event increased 
substantially in the run-up period as municipal finances were compromised. The 2016 bid 
would then become more aligned with Brazil foreign pROLF\GLVFRXUVHUHIOHFWLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶V
increasing prominent role, and having in President Lula an active poster boy. Acquired 
organising expertise, geopolitics, booming national and local economies and branding 
opportunities in bringing the event for the first time to South America were the raw elements 
that the team of seasoned consultants, with previous experience in the Sydney 2000 and London 
2012 candidatures, tailored to the IOC audience. Rio was then selected as the 2016 Olympic 
Games host in October 2009. 
The masterplan of the 2016 Games reinforced the concentration of venues and facilities at 
Barra da Tijuca but whereas the Pan American Games brought little contribution to the city¶V 
internal system, new transport networks and the regeneration of the port area embodied the 
expected material legacies. The new government of Mayor Eduardo Paes in 2009 reproduced 
at the local level the political coalition present at the state and national governments which then 
facilitated a shared agenda to release municipal, state and federal land for the regeneration of 
the port area. Despite not featuring any sports facilities, the project has been strongly associated 
as a legacy of the event with the Olympics providing a deadline for the conclusion of several 
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works that will transform it into a new mixed-use district of corporate towers, museums and 
residential area. The other visible programme associated with the Games is the construction of 
250 kilometres of segregated bus rapid transit (BRT) lanes and an extension of the 
underground, which together will improve the link of Barra with the other parts of the city. 
Without proper disclosure of the details of the projects a range of low-income communities 
learned their displacement for Olympic-related works as municipal staff turned up to mark their 
houses for demolition (Silvestre and Oliveira, 2012). A study of the Comitê Popular da Copa 
e das Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro (2013) estimated that almost 11,000 families had been 
affected by these works, and were offered temporary rental assistance, financial compensation 
or relocation to social housing estates in the western fringes of the city. Another element that 
has substantially affected the lives of the inhabitants of Rio favelas is the security programme 
of Police Pacifying Units (PPU) launched in 2008. Consisting of a joint effort between the 
%UD]LOLDQ $U\ DQG WKH VWDWH¶V HOLWH SROLFH VXDG LW RFFXSLHV JDQJ-controlled communities 
driving away drug traffickers while constructing police bases inside the favelas. Despite not 
being directly linked with the mega-events projects the geography of police occupations 
demonstrates the proximity to competition sites and tourist areas. Initial positive receptiveness 
by local residents has been marred by police abuse, the delayed arrival of public services, 
gentrification and the continuation of criminal activity.   
The indignation of part of the population together with rising living costs helped to fuel the 
local June 2013 demonstrations, with some estimated 300 thousand people taking to the streets 
of central Rio on 20 June (G1, 2013). Some concessions were announced by the state governor 
in backtracking on the decision to demolish the athletics and aquatics centre together with the 
museum of indigenous people at the Maracanã complex to make way for car parking spaces 
for the main stadium. The Rio mayor, Eduardo Paes, announced that evictions were to be 
temporarily suspended until detailed studies were produced, although these did not emerge in 
the following months.  
The same criticisms levied at the World Cup for its lavish spending and also for worrying 
project delays were also directed at 5LR¶VSUHSDUDWLRQIRUWKH2O\SLFVDVDVWULQJRIQHJDWLYH
comments on the readiness of the venues were the focus of press coverage. Two years prior to 
the opening ceremony Rio was reported to have just 10% of facilities ready (Jenkins, 2014) 
while the Olympic Park was still a desolate site with no erected structures and the sports cluster 
of Deodoro still awaiting tenders for development.   
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Conclusion 
The year 2014 marked several anniversaries for Brazil. It was 50 years since a military coup 
G¶pWDW brought about a twenty-one year long period of dictatorship and 29 \HDUV VLQFH LW¶V
replacement and re-democratization. During this time, and before, sport has remained firmly 
connected to politics in Brazil. When Lula became President in 2002 he inherited several 
problems from his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Public debt had doubled, the 
current account deficit was twice the average for South America, interest rates were over 20 
percent and the Brazilian currency was depreciating fast (Anderson, 2011). Whilst Lula 
introduced policies that materially impacted on the poorer sections of society, such as the 
µ%ROVD)DLOLD¶KLFKLQYROYHVDRQWKO\FDVKWUDQVIHUWRSRRURWKHUVDJainst proof that they 
were sending their children to school and getting regular health checks, he also became aware 
of the potential value of aligning with those interested in hosting sports mega-events.  
Through extension RI/HYHU¶VDUJXHQWHQWLRQHGLQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQ, Arbena (1995, p. 225) 
DUJXHVWKDWµWKHFDVHFRXOGDOVREHDGHWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRSHWLWLRQFDQOLNHLVHGLLQLVK
nationalism in favour of a greater sense of transnational community, if only through a sense of 
shared experiences and the consequences of operating within similar institutions and 
UHJXODWLRQV¶  The global impacts on the local via urban politics (Sanchez et al, 2014); but 
globalization also brings with it an amplification of existing contradictions in society and in 
football especially (Alvito, 2007). These include the Brazilian football player diaspora, club 
insolvency, youth talent capture by foreign clubs, consumerization of the fans, and media 
RQRSROLHV¶ LQIOXHQFH RYHU WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ of football competitions and seasons. Whilst 
attempts have been made to resist these developments by organising football fans, these have 
not had great success (Gaffney, 2013). Hence the seleção for the 2014 World Cup featured 20 
out of 23 players who played outside of Brazil, including, at the time of selection in early May, 
four from Chelsea in the English Premier League (EPL).  
What was initially thought of as a timely opportunity for domestic and foreign politics, as well 
as for personal benefits for those at the heart of the project, the 2014 FIFA World Cup turned 
into an anathema.  Anger directed towards FIFA and their expected record profit from the event 
affected even more the problematic reputation of the institution while it struggled with 
corruption scandals from other episodes (discussed elsewhere in this collection). International 
press coverage highlighted many problems with the preparation of the event and the contrasts 
between the lavish stadiums and precarious social conditions of many Brazilians. However, the 
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forecasts of a doomed event did not materialize, at least not from where it was expected. The 
press, FIFA, athletes and fans alike positively reviewed the general running of the event. 
Contrary to the scenes of the previous year, protests did not generate the same amount of 
support and were fewer and smaller, if still suppressed heavy-handedly. It was rather on the 
pitch that Brazilian hopes for some positive vision was crushed, including the biggest defeat in 
the history of the seleção, 7-1 by the eventual World Cup winners, Germany. As Alex Bellos 
(2014: 388-389) had noted before the competition:  
The parallels with 1950 are strong. Brazil has more swagger than it did but it remains an 
insecure country, desperate to show the world that it is a serious, competent and modern 
nation. Its own self image could again depend on a single goal.  
Or maybe 7! In 2016 however the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games will take place in 
Rio, and so a second opportunity awaits Brazilian hosts to demonstrate to the world their 
capacity to stage a large multi-sport mega-event. As with all such mega-events the political 
implications will comprise a mixture of the local, regional, national, international, as well as 
the sporting. 
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